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ABSTRACT
The Castro and Liskov Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol
for replicated state machines (CLBFT) provides a practical means of tolerating arbitrary replica failures in replicated passive data servers. For better performance, CLBFT
uses Message Authentication Codes (MAC) instead of public key cryptography to authenticate messages and preserves replica consistency even in the presence of malicious clients. However, CLBFT is susceptible to potential
attacks by malicious clients using corrupted MACs to force
replica groups into expensive configuration changes repeatedly. While not affecting correctness, this vulnerability can
seriously impair the performance of the replica group. We
propose modifications to CLBFT that address this problem.
We identify two key forms of attacks and present a viable
solution to each.
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Introduction

Critical distributed systems must employ Byzantine fault
tolerance to make progress in the presence of arbitrary
failures. The Castro and Liskov Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol (CLBFT) [1] is a practical means of tolerating such failures. Unlike other approaches to this problem [2, 3] that use public key cryptography for message
authentication, CLBFT uses message authentication codes
(MAC) [4] to authenticate communication between hosts.
The use of MACs drives down the cost of authentication
substantially, thereby increasing the suitability of CLBFT
for practical systems.
However, MACs can only be used to authenticate
point to point communication, unlike public key cryptography that supports third party message verification. Inspite
of this limitation, the CLBFT algorithm is resilient to malicious failures in both replicas and clients, in terms of correctness. However, a faulty client may utilize this weakness
to force expensive configuration changes in replica groups
repeatedly. The time to complete each subsequent configuration change increases exponentially. Therefore this vulnerability can seriously impair the performance of the algorithm. In this paper we identify two forms of attacks that
can be initiated by malicious clients on replica groups and
propose modifications to CLBFT to eliminate each threat.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-

tion 2 introduces the CLBFT algorithm and particularly
the view change protocol that is used for configuration
changes. In Section 3 we introduce two forms of attacks on
replica groups by malicious clients. We present our modifications to CLBFT to avoid these attacks in Section 4. Section 5 argues the merits of our approach against other possible solutions. In Section 6 we conclude with a discussion
of future work.
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Background

The CLBFT algorithm uses 3f + 1 replicas, where at most
f can be faulty. Messages can be delayed, provided that the
length of message delays does not increase faster than time
(a weak assumption). MACs are used to verify authenticity of messages, and message digests [5] are used to reduce
message size. The CLBFT algorithm for a mutating operation works roughly as follows (read operations require
less communication). A client sends its request to a designated primary replica, which appends a sequence number
and forwards it to the replicas in a pre-prepare message.
The replicas use this message to enter the pre-prepared
stage. Since the primary may be faulty, the replicas multicast a corresponding prepare message to each other, to
ensure that all were given the same request and sequence
number. Upon receiving 2f prepare messages matching
the pre-prepare it received from the primary, a replica enters the prepared stage and multicasts a commit message
to all the replicas. When it has matching commit messages
from 2f +1 replicas (possibly including itself), a replica enters the committed stage, executes the requested operation,
and sends the result to the client. Upon receiving f + 1
matching replies, the client accepts that return value. If a
client times out waiting for a reply (perhaps due to a faulty
primary), it multicasts its original request to all the replicas. The replica starts a request timer if the operation has
not yet executed. Also, if the replica has not yet received
a preprepare, it forwards the request to the primary. When
the operation completes, it replies to the client with the return value.
If progress under the current primary is unsatisfactory, the replicas change the primary in a view change operation. To propose a view change operation, the replicas
first send out a view-change message including the digests
of all requets that have pre-prepared and prepared but have
not committed. It then starts a view timer to wait for the

completion of the view change. When a replica receives
a valid view-change message it sends a view-change-ack
message to the proposed primary to acknowledge receipt
of the view-change message. When the new primary has at
least 2f+1 view-change messages and at least 2f-1 (2f+1 if
its own message and the view-change message are counted)
corresponding view-change-ack messages for each viewchange message, it uses the information contained in the
view-change messages to construct a new-view message.
The new primary sends the new-view message to all replicas who in turn use that information to (possibly) update
their local state and continue operation execution in the
new view. If the view timer at a replica expires before a
new view message is received, then the replica sends out
a view change message requesting the next view in the sequence. To adapt view timers to prevalent network conditions the timeout values for both request timers and view
timers double each time a replica decides to request a new
view. Since CLBFT assumes that length of message delays
does not increase faster than time, eventually all replicas
are guaranteed to receive a new-view message.
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Problem Description

In CLBFT, when a client sends a request to a replica group,
it includes an authenticator which contains a MAC for each
server replica. Each MAC is calculated over the digest of
the message using a previously established shared secret
key between the client and the corresponding replica. Regardless of whether the request was sent directly to the primary or multicast to the group, each server replica can use
its MAC in the authenticator to verify the contents of the request, provided that its MAC has not been corrupted. However, faulty clients can include corrupt MACs in the authenticator and thereby prevent a subset of server replicas from
verifying the request. Similarly a malicious server replica
can also corrupt a subset of MACs to achive the same result. In CLBFT these cases are indistinguishable and this
limitation leads to two scenarios where a malicious client
can repeatedly force view change operations at the sever.
[6]
3.1 Corrupted Non-Primary MACs
In the first form of attack, the malicious client includes a
valid MAC for the primary but will include less than f other
valid MACs for the rest of the non-faulty, non-primary
replicas. Then the client sends the request to the primary
who cannot detect that the MACs for the other replicas are
invalid. The unsuspecting primary verifies the request as
usual, assigns it a sequence number, and sends out the request and the corresponding pre-prepare message. Less
than f other correct replicas are able to verify the request
and therefore, send out prepare messages. The CLBFT algorithm specifies that a request can be verified either using the MAC or upon the receipt of f+1 prepare messages.
Neither case is possible in this attack and hence some nonfaulty replicas will never send prepare messages for the request. Consequently, the sequence number assigned to the

request will never be committed and hence no futher requests can be executed on the replica group. This situation
will eventually lead to a view change operation. Furthermore, this attack can be repeated for the next primary by
the malicious client.
3.2 Corrupted Primary MAC
In the second form of attack, the malicious client includes
valid MACs for at least one non-faulty, non-primary replica
and a corrupted MAC for the primary in its authenticator. It then directly sends the request to the corresponding non-primary replicas. Those replicas are able to verify
the request and therefore they forward the request to the
primary and start their request timers. The primary is unable to verify the request and hence cannot send out a preprepare message. The replicas that forwarded the request
will eventually timeout and start a view change operation.
This attack can also be repeated for the next primary by the
malicious client.

4

Modifications

In this section we present modifications to CLBFT that will
prevent each attack. In each case, the goal is to discriminate
between a malicious client and a malicious primary.
4.1 Corrupted Non-Primary MACs
In this case, the view change is triggered by the inability
to execute the request associated with a particular sequence
number. Therefore, if the primary can learn whether at least
2f other replicas can verify the request before assigning a
sequence number to a request, this attack can be avoided.
The simplest approach to this problem is for the primary
to first multicast the digest of the request along with the
authenticator to all replicas who will in turn send a validrequest message back to the primary. The primary will collect at least 2f responses before sending out the pre-prepare
message and the request. With this approach we guarantee that there are at least 2f + 1 replicas that claim to be
able to verify the request. Up to f of those replicas may
be faulty. However, the f other non-faulty replicas that verified the request will send out prepare messages and the
non-faulty replicas who were unable to verify the request
can use this quorum (including the pre-prepare message)
of prepare messages for verification, guaranteeing that all
replicas are able to verify the request. Even though this approach has the undesirable effect of adding an extra two
rounds of communication even for correct requests, the
improvement in performance in the presence of malicious
clients is significant since time to complete view changes
grows exponentially due to the exponential growth of the
request/view-change timeouts.
4.2 Corrupted Primary MAC
In this case, the view change is trigged by the inability
of a non-primary replica to determine whether the primary
MAC was corrupted. Since all correct replicas forward previously unseen requests to the primary, an obvious way for
the primary to verify the validity of the request without us-

ing the MAC would be to collect f+1 such forward messages. If such a quorum is achieved, then the primary is
guaranteed that at least one non-faulty replica received the
correct request and verified it using its own MAC.
However, the malicious client may counter this move
by sending correct MACs to at most f non-faulty replicas.
Then all replicas that authenticate the request will forward
the request and start request timers. However, the primary
does not receive a quorum of forward messages and is unable to process the request. An eventual view change operation will ensue from this scenario.
Once again we use the valid-request messages that
contain the digest of the request in question to deal with
this situation. When a replica receives a previously unseen request directly from the client, it will first attempt
to authenticate the request using its MAC. If it is unable to
authenticate the request, it does nothing. If the authentication is successful, the replica will forward the request to the
primary, start the request timer, and multicast valid-request
messages to the replica group. If the request timer expires,
the replica will send out a view-change message only when
it has received at least 2f other valid-request messages. If
such a quorum is achieved, a replica can safely conclude
that the primary would have been able to verify the request
either using its own MAC or a quorum of forwards since
at least f other non-faulty replicas would have forwarded
the request to the primary. Even if the primary was able to
verify the request, the request timers may still expire. However, this is desirable since it will force slow primaries to
loose their status as primary.
Once the primary is able to verify the request, the first
attack case still applies, since with just f+1 forwards the
primary has insufficient information to determine whether
f+1 non-faulty replicas received a valid MAC. However,
it cannot wait for 2f forwards, since fewer than 2f nonfaulty replicas may have received a correct MAC. In such a
case the primary may not be able to collet enough validrequest messages and consequently will not send a preprepare message to process the request. However, another
non-faulty replica may receive 2f valid-request messages
(with the participation of the faulty replicas). When the request timer of this replica times out it will then decide to
vote for a view-change. To avoid this scenario, the primary
must multicast the digest of the request along with the authenticator when it receives f+1 forward messages. It must
then collect 2f valid-request messages (possibly including
the messages sent during the previous phase) before sending out a pre-prepare message with the new sequence number.

5

Discussion

It has been claimed [6] that view change operations are sufficiently fast with the use of MACs to avoid any serious
performance degradation due to these attacks. However,
since the attacks can be repeated, and since the exponential
growth in timeouts may lead to longer waiting times before starting view change operations, further performance

evaluation is needed to assertion the validity of this claim.
While our solution to the first form of attack decreases
throughput for in the absence of faulty clients, we believe
that it would significantly improve the performance during attacks by malicious clients. Furthermore, we can improve throughput in the normal case by only adding the extra round trip only for requests from clients that previously
sent a request that lead to a view change. The extra round
of communication required to tolerate the second form of
attack runs in parallel with the regular CLBFT algorithm.
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Conclusion

In this paper we have identified two forms of attacks by
malicious clients that significantly impact performance of
replica groups that use CLBFT to tolerate Byzantine faults
and proposed modifications to guard against each attack.
We plan to conduct several experiments with and without our modifications to gauge the performance of replica
groups. We also plan to investigate whether reverting back
to using public key cryptography to authenticate request
messages will result in better overall performance.
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